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For its advocates, microfinance has become a near-panacea for ensuring that the poor of the
developing world would benefit from growth and development. In short, microfinance would
ensure that trickle down would actually trickle down. Microfinance became more than 'just' a
policy option when its staunchest proponent spoke of it in moral and social justice terms:
Muhammad Yunus, the Nobel laureate founder of Bangladesh's Grameen Bank, declared access
to credit as a basic human right.
One of the world's largest and most successful rural development Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) is the Aga Khan Rural Support Program (AKRSP), operating since 1982
in Pakistan's Northern Areas (NAs). Despite covering over 85% of the NAs million-plus rural
population and offering a full range of rural development services (credit, agricultural, forestry
and veterinary extension training, business consulting services, civil engineering, etc), the
AKRSP has been relatively unsuccessful in facilitating a successful transition to a marketoriented focus among its overwhelmingly subsistence-farmer beneficiary base. The AKRSP has
devoted substantial resources to trying to create a successful and self-sustaining microenterprise
culture among its clients but its results have been far from encouraging.
Given how few NGOs fall into the 'successful' category and how few have AKRSP's resources
and institutional resources, AKRSP's relative failure to promote successful microenterprises in
the NAs of Pakistan is a clear sign of the limits of microfinance success. While microfinance
may well provide some hope for poverty alleviation and social welfare indicator improvement, it
cannot provide all of the conditions necessary for sustainable economic development and longterm success for the poor.
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Introduction
When Professor Muhammed Yunus of Chittagong University’s Economics Department

in Bangladesh first lent 42 poor village women a total of $27 in 1976, he could not have known
that this would lead to the founding of the Grameen Bank, the creation of a revolutionary new
field—microfinance lending—in economic development theory and practice, and, in 2006, the
Nobel Peace Prize for his and the Bank’s “efforts to create economic and social development
from below” (Nobel Peace Prize 2006). Prof. Yunus has famously called access to credit a
“human right” and argued that conventional credit institutions not only favor the rich but “in so
doing have pronounced a death sentence on the poor” (Yunus 2003:150). Furthermore, Yunus
argues, effective poverty alleviation requires that we “recognize every single human being as a
potential entrepreneur” and in so doing realize that “the poor themselves can create a povertyfree world” (Yunus 2003:250). Yunus, it appears, is arguing that making credit available to "the
poor" would allow them to carry out a range of commercial activities that would increase their
income and thereby greatly reduce, if not outright eliminate, poverty.
Prof. Yusuf’s Grameen Bank experiment in microlending has, of course, had tremendous
success, growing from a handful of beneficiaries to approximately 7.27 million (96.7% female)
by 2007; total funds disbursed reached over $6.4 billion, with an astounding 98.4% cumulative
recovery rate. The Grameen Bank is much more than a microfinance institution making loans to
poor Bangladeshis. It is actually a very large conglomerate providing a variety of services (life
insurance, fishery development, telecommunications services, and so on) to some of the world’s
poorest people. Furthermore, since 1995, it has operated on a self-financing basis and no
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external donor funds are used in its various operations. 1 There are now some 30 countries with
microfinance programs patterned on the Grameen Bank’s (De Aghion and Morduch 2005:12).
Like Bangladesh, Pakistan ranks among the world’s poorest countries. As Table I
indicates, Bangladesh and Pakistan (one country prior to the 1971 Civil War) both have an
extremely high number of people subsisting at a very low subsistence level. Inspired in part by
the example of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and earlier development work done there in the
1960s, the 1980s saw the establishment in Pakistan of two large Non-Governmental
Organizations, the Aga Khan Rural Support Program (AKRSP) and the Orangi Pilot Project
(OPP), with a large microfinance component.
Table I: Basic Poverty and Population Data
GDP/capita
Percentage of population
(constant 2000 US$) Population living on $2/day or less

Country
Pakistan
1,842
145 million
(2002 data)
Bangladesh
1,543
129 million
(2000 data)
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007

74
84

The focus of this paper shall be on the microfinance and commercial enterprise
development experience of the AKRSP and its microfinance successor organization, the First
Microfinance Bank, in Pakistan's remote Northern Areas (NAs). While the AKRSP has been
successful in extending microfinance to the subsistence farmers of the NAs, how successful have
they been in creating self-sustaining economic development via the growth of commercially
successful microenterprises? That is, after two decades of continual work, are the enterprises
financed by the credit AKRSP made available to small borrowers commercially successful and
sustainable ones?

1

Data from Grameen Bank Monthly Report, August 2007; for more details on the Bank and its range of services, see
the Grameen Bank website, http://www.grameen-info.org/.
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It is a truism that it takes money to make money. Obviously all successful entrepreneurs
require access to credit but does access to credit guarantee a successful entrepreneur? This paper
will argue that while a lack of credit may automatically doom a project, obtaining credit is no
guarantee of success.

II

The AKRSP and Rural Development
The Northern Areas (NAs) of Pakistan 2 are among the remotest and most inaccessible

parts of the world. They are also among the poorest: "Based on 1998/99 data, the average
person in the NAs is still living on about 50 cents US per day" (World Bank 2002:37). The NAs
cover an area of 74,200 km2 and have an estimated population of 1,086,057, almost completely
rural and subsistence farmers, in 2000. The people of the NAs speak five mutually unintelligible
languages and are scattered across some 1,123 villages and a few small towns across in rugged
terrain and the AKRSP serves over 85% of all rural households in the NAs (World Bank,
2002:76-77). Most of the land is above 1,200 meters altitude, with permanent settlements as
high as 3,000 meters. The logistics difficulties of operating in the region are made starkly
obvious if one considers that five of the world's fourteen 'eight-thousanders' (i.e., peaks over
8,000 meters in height) are located in the NAs.
The basic unit of the AKRSP is the Village Organization (VO) through which the
AKRSP channels all of its development efforts. To qualify for AKRSP assistance, a prospective
VO must hold a series of meetings, organize at least 75% of its households and each household

2

The NAs comprising of Gilgit, Ghizar, Diamir, Astore, Skardu and Ghanche districits are a de facto fifth province
of Pakistan; the AKRSP's program area includes a district of the North West Frontier Province, Chitral, as well as
the NAs proper. Gilgit district is the largest in population (35% of the total) and most economically developed part
of the NAs.
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must start regular contributions to its own savings account, 3 and elect a VO Manager and
Bookkeeper. Finally, the VO must decide upon an initial project to be funded by the AKRSP
and which will deliver tangible economic benefits. This project usually involves irrigation since
all agriculture in the NAs is irrigation-dependent.
The AKRSP maintains a very successful integrated rural development program that
includes the all-important social organization component, as well as agricultural, livestock,
commercial marketing, forestry, human resource development and technical training, appropriate
technology, rural credit and women-in-development components. It also includes a small-scale
(village level) civil engineering section. It provides infrastructure (roads, bridges, irrigation
systems and rural electrification), human capital development (agricultural and livestock
extension training; primary and secondary education is in conjunction with the Aga Khan
Education Services), and basic healthcare (in conjunction with the Aga Khan Health Services).
The AKRSP, although it is not a World Bank project, has been evaluated four times by
the World Bank's Operations Evaluation Department on behalf of its external donors. These
evaluations (in 1987, 1990, 1995, and 2000) have been almost uniformly laudatory and often
contrast the AKRSP's results to the Bank's own much less effective rural development trackrecord. In 1990 the Bank stated that, "At a time when 'rural development' as a development
strategy is out of favor, the AKRSP experience provides a hopeful prospect that rural
development can be made to work" (World Bank 1990:5). The Bank’s most recent (2002:xiii)
3

The initial savings contributions were often minimal. The intention was to get the villagers used to making
regular contributions to their individual (informal VO level) savings accounts, which were then pooled together into
a formal VO savings account at a regular bank. Records were kept of each household's share of the VO account and
each household's contribution was its own and did belong collectively to the VO. These savings then served as
collateral for loans made to the VO by the AKRSP. By 2000, the total value of member savings had reached
Pakistani Rupees (PKR) 429 million (~US$ 6.7 million) while the total value of loans outstanding in 2002 was PKR
142 million (~US$ 2.2 million) (World Bank 2002:103). In 2002 all VO savings and loan obligations were
transferred to the First Microfinance Bank, Ltd., the successor credit institution to the AKRSP’s credit and loan
program. All exchange rate conversions in this paper are made using the World Bank determined annual average
exchange rate reported in World Bank (2002) for the year(s) in question.
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evaluation concluded that almost two decades after its inception, the AKRSP's "achievements
have been remarkable and, unlike many other donor-funded interventions, sustained."
Like the Grameen Bank, the AKRSP also emphasized the importance of access to
microcredit for its beneficiary households as agricultural credit is as vital a production input in
an agrarian economy as, say, fertilizer. Without ready access to sufficient credit, agricultural
production and productivity is severely affected. Given their limited financial resources,
subsistence farmers are, of course, severely hurt by the inability to obtain agricultural credit.
Prior to the AKRSP's formation, the large farmers in the region monopolized almost all of the
formal agricultural credit available. In Gilgit in 1983 the AKRSP disbursed US$ 54,198 in
short-term production loans to 4,050 farming households, for an average loan size of US$ 13.38.
In the same year, three years after the inception of the Pakistani government's interest-free smallfarmer production loan program, not one of the 28,000 eligible small farmers in Gilgit had
received a loan from the agencies responsible for its implementation. Gilgit's large farmers
monopolized institutional credit: 16% of all farmers received 47% of total formal sector credit
disbursement. 4
In 1991, almost a decade later, the situation was essentially unchanged. Total formal
sector credit disbursement of US$ 5.46 million went to 2,600 borrowers for an average loan size
of US$2,100, while the AKRSP disbursed approximately US$ 1.13 million among 30,000 small
farmers for an average loan size of $38. 5 By 1997 the average loan size had reached $158, 6 due
mainly to the AKRSP introducing several different credit products, including Corporate and
Enterprise Credit Loans (Hussein and Plateau 2006:328)

4

See Aga Khan Rural Support Program (1991:85) for details.

5

Aga Khan Rural Support Program (1992:95) for details.
Calculated from Table 7.1.1, Aga Khan Rural Support Program (1998).

6
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The AKRSP has attempted to reduce the subsidy element, and minimize the severity of
the resulting 'dependence culture,' inherent in all such projects. For example, when the AKRSP
began encouraging farmers to increase fertilizer use, it made them fertilizer loans at market
interest rates 7 and organized buying trips to nearby towns so that VOs, and not AKRSP agents,
bought the fertilizer in bulk at wholesale rates. While the AKRSP paid the initial transportation
costs, farmers had to pay the actual cost of fertilizer and organize next year's buying trips on their
own (with some AKRSP non-monetary assistance if needed). Most loans, except those for land
development or large farm machinery purchase, were made on an annual basis and future loans
were contingent upon satisfactory repayment of current ones.
Following the same operating pattern as the Grameen Bank, the AKRSP made a lumpsum credit disbursement to the VO as a whole instead of to individuals and the VO was
responsible for individual loan decisions and eventual repayment of the loan plus interest. While
there existed a short-term individual free-riding default incentive, long-term village-level benefit
flows required that VOs ensured loan repayment. The VO thus internalized monitoring costs and
so reduced the cost to the AKRSP of administering a relatively large-scale credit program. For
example, there were early reports of villagers deciding to repay individual defaults out of village
savings and then auctioning off the defaulter's assets to recompense the VO (Khan and Khan,
1992).
While default rates for short-term (less than one year) loans were virtually zero, longer
term loan defaults increased over time: by end-1994, medium-term "Micro-enterprise Credit"
loans had a 27% default rate but since only 3% of loans were more than six months overdue, the
World Bank's 1995 AKRSP evaluation attributed most of the default problem as being a simple

7

This has not changed over time. The World Bank (2002:106) calculated that the AKRSP did not directly subsidize
its then lending program.
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timing issue: the lump-sum credit disbursement to the VO meant that all the longer-term loans
had a uniform due date that did not match the actual cash-flow of individual borrowers (World
Bank 1995:86). However, the AKRSP reacted proactively by phasing out certain types of the
more problematic longer-term loans (e.g., land development) and dedicating more resources to
managing the loan portfolio and auditing individual VOs (World Bank 2002:105-106). Although
only 5.6% of AKRSP's entire loan portfolio of PKR 142 million (US$ 2.2 million) in 2000 was
viewed as being "at risk" (World Bank 2002:26 & 103), the AKRSP was in the process of
rethinking its entire credit program due to the increasing demand for a wider range of credit
options and the resulting increase in administrative costs and persistent loan recovery issues in
longer term loans.
By 2000, the AKRSP's training program had trained 20,587 people in skills ranging from
elementary bookkeeping and accounting to traditional rural development extension work
(agricultural, veterinary and forestry) to basic marketing and Traditional Birth Attendants (World
Bank 2002:92). By the same year, the AKRSP's small scale civil engineering program, the
Mountain Infrastructure and Engineeering Services (MIES) program, had completed 1,917
separate public works projects, including several hundred kilometers of link roads, bridges,
irrigation projects and protective dikes (World Bank 2002:85). The importance of the MIES
work in this incredibly rugged, mountainous area cannot be overemphasized. For example, the
completion of a link road for a remote village not only improved its access to markets but
actually greatly reduced its maternal and infant mortality rates since it reduced the travel time
from to the nearest hospital from two days walk to two hours by jeep (World Bank 2002:9).
The MIES was responsible for 167 microhydel projects (i.e., 167 villages electrified) and
one fourth (48,000 hectares) of all cultivated land in the NAs, a subsistence economy where 60%

7
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of household income comes from farming (World Bank 2002:28 & 30). Finally, AKRSP
Household Income and Expenditure Surveys indicated that, between 1991 and 1997, real per
capita household income in AKRSP VOs increased 260%, with individual households attributing
between 10-50% of this increase to AKRSP activities (World Bank 2002:9).
In spite of the difficulties of operating in the NAs and the scale of its operation, the
AKRSP is not an inordinately expensive program. The estimated cost (in constant 1988 dollars)
for the AKRSP for the 12 year period 1983-1994 was approximately $500 per beneficiary
household, much less than the $1,000 per beneficiary household for comparable World Bank
programs for a six to eight year period (World Bank, 1988:48) and these costs had not increased
significantly in the period 1994-2000 (World Bank, 2002:12). 8 Between 1982-2000, total
AKRSP expenditure was US$ 89 million, peaking at US$ 9.29 million in 1998 before declining
to US$ 4.89 million in 2000, and there is no evidence of escalating per beneficiary spending as
being responsible for its institutional success (World Bank 2002:96). This is in direct contrast to
a common allegation in Pakistan that AKRSP's success is due to its lavish and ever-increasing
budget and very high cost per beneficiary household.
The AKRSP thus has a long record of successfully delivering needed goods and services
to its beneficiaries at a relatively low cost. Khan and Tessendorf (2001) attribute AKRSP's
success to its focus on delivering 'demand-side' development, i.e., focusing on what the
beneficiaries actually want rather than what some distant government bureaucrat or development
planner thinks they should have.
In November 2001, following the issuance of the Microfinance Ordinance by the
Government of Pakistan, which created a legal foundation for specialized microfinance banks,
8

However, while comparatively cheap by World Bank project standards, the AKRSP per beneficiary spending,
while within the range of all (World Bank and locally sponsored) large rural development projects, it is at the high
end of this range. Given the logistics difficulties of working in the NAs, this is not surprising.
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AKRSP's extensive microfinance operations were transferred to the newly established First
Microfinance Bank Limited, FMBL (Voice Magazine 2005). The AKRSP owns 45.45% of
FMBL’s shares outstanding, while the Aga Khan Agency for Microfinance owns 30.3% and the
World Bank's International Finance Corporation owns the remaining 26.67%. Thus FMBL is
essentially a subsidiary of the AKRSP and a member of the wider Aga Khan Development
Network of which AKRSP is an important component. 9
The decision to hive-off microfinance from the AKRSP's development work was made
after increasing loan delinquencies in larger longer-term loans, unrest among some members due
to the AKRSP's policy of deducting loan defaults from the VO's collective savings given as
collateral to the AKRSP, and disturbing reports of embezzlement and preferential lending
practices among some VOs (Hussein and Plateau 2006:334 & 337).
These continuing issues, despite increasing the monitoring and auditing of intra-VO
lending, 10 and several external consultancy reports (Dichter 2003:171-173) convinced the
AKRSP’s Board that major changes were needed in key AKRSP procedures. The AKRSP,
which still had near-zero short-term loan defaults, decided to set up a separate agency to handle
all microfinancing since its policy aim was to expand the economic development of the NAs
through the development of local business enterprises. Commercial lending, it was felt, could be
better administered through a private financial institution, leaving the AKRSP free to devote its

9

During Fiscal Year 2006, FMBL disbursed PKR 1 billion (~US$ 16.67 million) in loans, virtually doubling total
credit disbursement over Fiscal Year 2005. The average loan size in 2006 was PKR 19,000 (~US $ 317) at a
weighted average annual effective interest rate of 28% (about average for most microfinance lending) and the Bank's
average margin on loans was 9.9%. However, FMBL collects deposits from and lends to an all-Pakistan customer
basis and is not confined to just the NAs as was the case with the AKRSP. However, MFBL is the largest such
organization in the NAs, which constitute an important portion of its lending base. (All data is from Maqbool and
Usmani 2007.)
10
For example, between 1995 and 2000, the AKRSP increased its Micro-Finance section's field officers responsible
for loan auditing and performance evaluation from six to thirty-one (Hussein and Plateau 2006:342).
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energies to continuing its rural development work and integrating the subsistence population of
the NAs into a market economy.

III

Commercial Growth and Development in the Northern Areas
There is considerable empirical evidence to support Yunus's contention that conventional

credit institutions discriminate against poorer borrowers; or at least that they favor the big and
powerful at the expense of the smaller and poorer. Stein (2002:1913-1914) finds that large banks
systematically discriminate against small businesses if these firms do not meet their
predetermined balance-sheet based lending criteria, with the implication here that perhaps the
loan amount is too small for large banks to bother with. This is in keeping with Cole et al's
finding that in the US large banks
employ standard criteria obtained from financial statements in the loan decision
process, whereas smaller banks rely to a larger extent on information about the
character of the borrower. (Cole et al 2004:1; emphasis added.)
Banerje and Duflo (2004:30-31) find that small firms in India face a severe bank credit
crunch and, when bank credit is reduced, have to reduce their output, resulting in lower sales and
profits. Since these are all small formal sector firms, inadequate access to credit is presumably
even worse in the informal sector.
Since its inception in 1982, the AKRSP has followed a policy of encouraging its VOs to
become better integrated into the private, for profit, sector in the NAs. It has, for example,
encouraged some VOs to grow seed potatoes for sale to commercial buyers, producing higher
quality eggs, chicken, milk, apples, cherries, apricots, etc., for sale to the hotels catering to
Pakistani and foreign tourists. In this context, the AKRSP runs training courses to familiarize
local farmers and VO agricultural and commercial extension workers in the basics of marketing,

10
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producing a uniform and standard quality product, and so on, as well as organizing initial
marketing trips out of the NAs for selected farmers so that they can interact with vegetable and
fruit wholesalers in a safe environment.
In short, for the last 20 years, the AKRSP has been trying to integrate subsistence farmers
into the NAs commercial structure. Earlier, in the 1990s, the AKRSP also expanded directly
into vocational training, providing such training courses as "hotel management, carpet weaving,
school uniform stitching, quilt making, carpentry, plumbing, hair cutting, pottery making,
[electrical] motor rewinding, mine blasting, gem-stone cutting and polishing, candle making and
fabric dying" (Afzal 2006:2164). These courses vary in length from a week to six weeks plus;
refresher courses are usually much shorter in duration.
For example, in 1997 alone, the AKRSP, in addition to its regular and refresher
agricultural, forestry, appropriate technology and farm machinery maintenance, and veterinary
extension courses, also ran training courses in concrete block making and home construction,
poultry farm management, food processing, post-harvest crop storage, carpet weaving,
embroidery, and shawl making, retail business management, carpentry, fruit and vegetable
preservation and retail marketing,
In short, the AKRSP has tried to create a local business/market culture and create new
human capital where previously, other than a few small shopkeepers, peddlers and traditional
craftsmen, none had existed before. The AKRSP has
provided business support directly on a one-to-one basis, established its own
businesses, serviced larger groups through strengthening indigenous associations
and of late it is trying to adopt a more facilitative role in strengthening local
markets (Afzal 2006:259).

11
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The AKRSP has continually revised its approach when it became clear that its chosen
strategy was not succeeding. It's approach to private sector development and commercialization
has had three distinct phases: 11

1

VO Based Cooperative Marketing 1982-1991
Here the AKRSP ‘encouraged’ very strongly collective marketing of by its Vos in an

attempt to standardize output (e.g., only eight of the estimated twenty different fruit varieties
grown in the NAs had a commercial market), reduce prohibitively high transactions costs, and
reduce the bargaining-power disparity between subsistence farmers and wholesale buyers. By
1988, 52.57% of all VOs were engaged in collective marketing but continuing problems with it
(difficulty in reaching agreement among members, disputes over cost sharing, marketing
recompensation, free riding, etc) resulted in the AKRSP abandoning this approach in 1991.
However, a tiny minority of the most successful VOs continued collective marketing; by 1997
only 8% of VOs were collectively marketing their output but income per household involved had
risen a staggering 20-fold, from Pakistani Rupees (PKR) 1,675 to PKR 34,064.

2

Alternative Approach to Enterprise Development 1992-2002
Realizing the failure of its collective approach, the AKRSP attempted to create the human

capital infrastructure it thought was necessary for the successful commercialization of production
in the NAs. In short, it attempted to lay the human and institutional capital foundations
necessary for building a market economy. It provided marketing training, technical expertise
and consulting services, underwrote the purchase of specialized machinery, arranged marketing
trips, brought buyers up from down-country, and so on. It also set up a special entrepreneurial
11

The following information in this section, unless noted otherwise, is from Afzal 2006.

12

Feisal Khan

The Limits of Success

HPRC Conference, UW-Madison 2008

credit fund where it financed projects for VO members (average loan size was PKR 300,000,
~US$ 7,500 in the mid-1990s).
Despite great initial enthusiasm and some minor successes (e.g., marketing locally
produced honey, traditional cloth—shu, or women-run village-level tailoring businesses), the
major ventures it promoted, a carpet-weaving firm, handicrafts manufacturing and marketing,
fruit processing and jam making, etc, were not successful and ultimately folded. The main
reasons for their failure was uncompetitively high production costs compared to their downcountry rivals. In all, when this phase of AKRSP commercial sector development was
essentially wound up in 2002, the AKRSP had directly supported 626 firms, trained 4,718
Yunusian "entrepreneurs" (51% of them women) and disbursed PKR 297.17 million 12 in loans in
the period 1992-2002.
By the late-1990s it became obvious that commercial development in the NAs was not
going to be as successful as the AKRSP had initially hoped for. The AKRSP decided to set up
its own businesses in order to speed up the process of creating a market where none had existed
before.
The three AKRSP enterprises established were the Dry Fruit Project (now renamed
Mountain Fruits), North-South Seeds, and Shubinak. Each of these three attempted to follow the
comparative advantage principle and promote a local product to the outside world. The idea here
was that while subsistence farmers by themselves could not create an external market demand for
their products but that, once such demand existed, the small farmers would be able to supply it.

12

Approximately US$ 6.6 million using an average exchange rate of Pak Rupee 45 = $1 for the time period; of this
amount, US$0.6 million was lent to women entrepreneurs.
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This was a conscious attempt to create entities that would promote backwards and forwards
linkages in the production process.13

Dry Fruit Project
Set up by the AKRSP in 1997 at an initial investment of PKR 4 million (US$ 97,500), the Dry
Fruit Project (now renamed Mountain Fruits, MF) provides 'fair trade' apricots to the UK-based
firm Tropical Wholefoods, which in turn sells it as an input to various 'fair trade' firms in the UK
and the EU and markets ‘Hunza Apricots’ itself. MF is also marketing its own products (dried
apricots and apples, as well as mulberries and cherries) in the rest of Pakistan and the
AKRSP/MF brand carries considerable name recognition in Pakistan as a symbol of quality. MF
was phenomenally successful and broke even within 18 months. Through a relentless emphasis
on purchasing only the best quality fruit, the MF has caused farm-gate prices for its, for example,
desired grade of apricots to double. The overall impact of the AKRSP's efforts here has been
quite impressive as the price difference between the farm-gate price of the lowest grade of dried
apricots (PKR 3-10 per kilogram) and the highest (PKR 20-45 per kilogram) is now substantial
(Roomi et al 2002) and farmers are improving their fruit quality in order to earn the higher
prices. Prior to this, the price differential was not enough to encourage farmers to improve fruit
quality. However, despite the considerable increase in output marketed, from 8 metric tons in
1998 to 47 in 1999 (Roomi et al 2002), there are only an estimated 500 farmers selling to MF so
in that sense its overall impact is relatively small in the NAs and most farmers do not benefit
directly.

North South Seeds
13

Although to the best of my knowledge this Hirschmanian terminology was not used within the AKRSP.

14

Feisal Khan

The Limits of Success

HPRC Conference, UW-Madison 2008

This was the AKRSP's venture into commercial agricultural seed production for the
domestic Pakistani market, estimated at PKR 200 million (~US$ 4 million plus) in 1999 and
growing at 14% p.a., with most of this demand being met by smuggled Indian seeds. North
South Seeds was set up at a cost of PKR 60 million (US$ 0.94 million) in 1999 and immediately
ran into severe quality control problems as the large number of small, usually illiterate,
subsistence farmers it had to deal with made quality control extremely difficult. 14 North-South
had to, at times, resort to using commercial farmers down-country to meet its contractual
obligations. As of 2004, five years after its inception, North-South Seeds was nowhere close to
breaking even financially. While successful commercial seed production is a very long term
process, the difficulties experienced by North-South Seeds exemplify the difficulties inherent in
successful commercialization in the NAs. However, this experience has greatly increased the
farming expertise, production quality and income of the roughly 500 small farmers, half women,
it contracts with for seed production. For example, while per capita income in NAs was ~PKR
10,000 (US$ 244) in 1997, the average farmer earned PKR 4,638 (~US$ 95) in sales to North
South Seeds in 1999 and 96% of the contract growers wanted to expand sales to the firm (Roomi
et al 2002).

Shubinak
Shu, or patti, is the extremely fine, very high quality local wool (akin to cashmere or pashmina)
produced in Chitral, Pakistan. It has traditionally been used to make very expensive caps, shawls
and coats and is usually hand-spun as a cottage-industry by women. The AKRSP decided to set

14

From the personal knowledge of the author, some of the key quality control issues here were: keeping the seeds
from being contaminated with those of other varieties, ensuring that seed production is done in disease-free soil,
preventing animals from grazing in fields used for seed production (a vitally important issue in an environment
where free grazing used to be the norm), etc.
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up a new firm, Shubinak, 15 in an attempt to standardize and raise shu quality and market it
abroad to cash in on the international pashmina craze of the 1990s. AKRSP's decision to
become involved in shu marketing was in part a reaction to traders selling much lower-quality,
usually machine-spun, down-country wool as shu and thus reducing the market price and
demand for high-quality shu. With no comprehensive plan to defend traditional shu, it was
feared that an important source of household income for village women would soon be
destroyed.
Starting in 1999, the AKRSP invested over PKR 37.9 million (~US$ 0.6 million plus) in
quality control and market creation for high quality shu. Among other measures, it instituted a
four-year price support program for 'golden shu' (the highest grade) in order to give weavers an
incentive to improve quality. The AKRSP also trained women in improved spinning techniques
and subsidized equipment purchase.
While the international marketing efforts, undertaken at considerable cost, failed
completely, AKRSP's insistence on standardization and quality control doubled the whole-sale
price of 'golden shu' and created a larger domestic market for it. However, due to the extremely
high cost of ‘golden shu,’ this market segment is still extremely small in Pakistan and most shu
purchasers are price and not quality conscious.
In addition, the traditional marketing practices in Chitral are that weavers supply shu on a
deferred payment basis to local middlemen who then sell the shu, again on credit, to retailers
down-country. The highly informal nature of most of these transactions means that payments are
usually greatly delayed and dealing with new purchasers/retailers is fraught with default risk: one
deals with buyers and retailers one knows and trusts. This practice means that, perforce, the
effective universe of producers, wholesalers and retailers is a very small one and economic
15

Meaning literally spider or, here, weaver, in Chitrali.
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transactions are correspondingly reduced. Shubinak made payment-upon-delivery to its weavers
but could not insist upon this for its buyers. It therefore had considerable carry-over financing
costs as well as legal and administrative costs in pursuing payment from its buyers (down
country retailers). While Shubinak was successful from a quality-raising and wholesale price
perspective, this is clearly not a sustainable enterprise from a purely financial perspective unless
a new and expanded network of down-country retailers is possible.

3

Business Development Services (2003 on)
In 2003, following the major restructuring of its credit program, the AKRSP initiated the

transition to the third phase of integrating the NAs economy into a market structure. In effect it
decided to reduce its emphasis on encouraging microentrepreneurship--the transition from
subsistence farming to commercial activities for its beneficiaries--to simply Business
Development Activities (BDS). The AKRSP defines BDS as "any nonfinancial service provided
to a business on either a formal or informal basis which adds value to the business" (Afzal
2006:301). That is, the AKRSP was no longer going to attempt to create markets where none
existed before. It was simply going to facilitate the activities of existing market participants in
improving output, reducing costs, and so on. This was, in effect, an admission of defeat and was,
not uncoincidentally, linked to the setting up of a separate microfinance institution (the FMBL)
to handle all AKRSP's savings and credit functions.
Since 2002 the AKRSP has assisted the Baltistan Gem Association (a non-AKRSP trade
association) in both improving its mining methods and putting on a Gem Show in Islamabad in
an effort to attract new buyers, bypass traditional down-country middlemen and so keep more of
the value-added in the NAs. It has assisted the Chitral Association of Mountain Area Tourism
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(another non-AKRSP trade association) in improving its tourism marketing and internal quality
controls. It has also assisted non-VO based apple and apricot marketing groups (i.e., individual
farmers' associations not associated with the traditional AKRSP VO structure) in advertising,
packaging, and so on, for their products.
However, old habits die hard and the AKRSP is still 'encouraging' the development of
new entrepreneurial activity in the NAs. For example, it has encouraged recent college graduates
to start new firms: the "Apna Karobar Scheme" (i.e., My Own Business) which selects and
trains 20-25 young entrepreneurs each year, assists them in establishing their own businesses and
arranges startup funding for them through the government-owned Small and Medium Enterprise
Bank (Ismail and Hussain 2003:30).

IV

Conclusion
Despite decades of effort and the expenditure of large amounts of financial and material

resources, the AKRSP has not been able to create a market society in the NAs and use that to
ensure a self-sustaining process of economic growth and development in the region. This is not
an unsurprising outcome since the creation of a market society, much less an entrepreneurial
culture, is the result of generations of socio-economic development. The transformation of
subsistence farmers into microentrepreneurs was never going to be easy or, as it turns out,
feasible.
While no doubt successful in increasing the standard of living and quality of life for the
subsistence farmers of the NAs, a very poor part of a very poor country, the AKRSP failed in its
efforts to create a market economy there as the private sector is still virtually nonexistent in the
NAs. There are only an estimated 23,066 jobs in the private sector in the NAs for a population
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of over one million (Ismail and Hussain 2003:ix) and a labor force growing at 5% p.a. (Ismail
and Hussain 2003:12). It is in this context that after evaluating two decades of AKRSP
development efforts therein, the World Bank evaluation concluded that
As has long been the case, the future for a significant proportion of the population
does not lie within the NAC [i.e., Northern Areas and Chitral]. Support and
assistance in employment information and in the migration process itself may be
warranted. (World Bank 2002:35.)
It is thus clear that the AKRSP has not been able to turn the NAs into an economically
viable part of Pakistan and it is here that the limits of its success have been reached.
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